If someone successfully created an online currency it would naturally gain attention from malicious hackers based on its success and value (price). This meant if the e-currency wasn’t ultra (or perfectly) secure there is no hope for it to not be hacked, and therefore there could not be a public confidence in it. What Satoshi did was create an incentive for malicious attackers to be honest (“cooperate”), by paying them bitcoins to hold up the bitcoin network (at the same time he set the security mechanism to fluctuate in relation to the “power” of the attacker). Its really an economics problem that you solve with an equilibrium.
Ideal Poker shows that online poker functions identical to an e-currency which is why there is always such special legal and political attention on ipoker.
Already there are major poker projects almost complete from years and months of development that are based on this “un-hackable” principle. However these projects are built by programmers and they lack the understanding of how to connect the community with the secure software that cannot be hacked.
What we did was create a transition plan from the current centralized models to the new decentralized one. We call this plan “Asymptotically Ideal Poker”. Without a central authority players will need a way to combat certain types of multi-accounting and/or collusion, and we do this by creating a finite amount of “trust nodes” so the players can create a highly functioning anonymous and automated web of trust.
This is why the players need there OWN finite currency in order to link the community together in a network. The value of this currency is related to Metcalf’s law and a recent formalization of Adam Smith’s works on the value of transport and transaction efficiency.
This is how you create sites that cannot be DDos’d and these new sites will arise overnight once the players start to adopt and understand their universal poker currency.