The author has been meaning to address this and some other lower hanging software/project fruit related to the decentralization of poker. This poster has given a good ground for one such explanation:
It seems to me that MTT staking deals are often way too simple. It usually works good when the stakee is winning, but there are often disputes when he goes into long and deep makeup. Stakee who is over a year in makeup might lose his motivation and stop playing his A-game and thats bad for both stakee and staker. So it seems rational, that there should be some rules in the deal to prevent that. Yet I have never seen something like expiring makeup in MTT. (It obviously would have to be for much longer periods than what Sauce does with his CG staking).
How would a rational medium-term deal or deal with expiring makeup look like?
Lets say this is the default deal, which can in worst case scenario end up in makeup for years (it is reasonable to think that staker would forgive part of the makeup to motivate the stakee, but no such thing is guaranteed and there are no specifics on how and when to do it):
rakeback 100% for stakee
Profit is immediately divided
stakee cant leave when in makeup
10-14 tabling several pokersites
Stakee cant be forced to play lower buy ins when in makeup.
Most tourneys allowed except hard/expensive stuff like sunday 162 6max, 82 hypers, 215 turbos, sunday 500, 55 reentry turbo, 109 turbo…
Stakee has to play at least 3days a week on average.
And now few ideas on how to make some more temporary deals:
variant A)If stakee is in makeup longer than 3 months, then makeup expires.
variant B)If stakee is in makeup longer than 3 months, then 50% of makeup expires. Stakee has to start (if staker wants to) second 3 months deal. If that ends in makeup, then makeup expires.
variant C)Deal is set to exactly 3 months. Profit will be divided at the end. (so if stakee goes 30k up in the beggining and then 30k down, then staker is breakeven instead of minus 15k)
How much should the profit split be in those variants?
(A) should obviously be less than 50% for stakee.
(B) would be more than A but still under 50%.
(C) I am not sure. 3 months only is bad for staker but the fact, that stakee cant get any money during the deal and potentially lose afterwards is good for the staker.
What percentages would be fair? Other suggestions for rules in MTT deals also welcomed.
The issue is that when you actually sit down and try to crunch the numbers the variance is so large in either situation it gets immediately silly. Others might argue this of course, but one just has to point out that no such “charts” exist for this or can be made with any reasonableness remaining. A player could just ignore this and say “yes it can” but choose never to come up with the numbers. One could also point out that many formulas exist for these things, but that still does not deal with the fact that you cannot apply the parameters here in a meaningful way.
Another way of looking at it is backers do not know the value of their deals. And so arbitrarily raising the variance is too arbitrary for them.
Now here is something strange: I think your idea is amazing.
IF, and only if, someone could create a way to stabilize effective rake, then not only could you create such accurate contracts, but you could render the entire staking design into a piece of software using the new programming language concept “smart contracts”
Staking could be done automatically with programmable money so that every clause on the contract is completely automated. The money saved form disputes and inefficiencies alone would be significant for everyone in the game!