[QUOTE=TopPair2Pair;46675800]Evolving area or revolving door…?
So this is why the rake is soo high???? lol. damn you ddossers !![/QUOTE]
Considering the truth of it, its not really funny though is it? It has already been extensively shown that third parties used for security and trust are themselves security leaks that end up costing the players dearly. The centralized poker model cannot help but facilitate this especially in relation to its counterpart.
It’s true to that recent re-levation of ddos attacks is not only natural evolution but also very founded in well understood economics. As technology grows (for example as other “institutions” gain attack proof security mechanisms ie bitcoin for banking/currency), there will be more and more such pressure on weaker but bountiful institutions such as poker stars and other successful sites.
In this regard sites function no less like that of a bank, and thus require no less than the security measures and mechanisms that an online banking system would need (if nothing else such security leaks provide a perfect channel for money laundering/fraud etc.).
There are in fact two possibly (and likely/efficient solutions) but unfortunately for the centralized model they are not so accessible but for the players. The first involves moving poker to a p2p type platform, and the 2nd involves paying enough of the attackers to hold up the system so that they might prefer to do so rather than attack it. Then there only needs to be a certain limited amount of “bounty” offered in relation to creating a large enough pool that would protect the game (ie 50+% decentralized in it’s own NE).
If it can be shown (and I am sure it can) that the cost of securing the game in this fashion is feasible and especially more feasible than the current rake exiting the game (especially for this purpose) is equally favorable (or more so), then there can be an equilibrium shown that will necessarily suggest a theoretical solution (which would then necessarily fit current known “working” experiments) .
[QUOTE]Pokereum: An Efficient Smart Contract Dependent Decentralized Poker Platform
Abstract. A secure peer-to-peer (p2p) version of traditional online poker would allow trustless and provably fair poker games. [/QUOTE]
In the above solution (prob the link won’t work but its a 30 page leading paper on the subject, already in coding stage and nearly finished apparently), which is the most prominent of today’s present circumstance, there is nearly exactly this solution, except these author’s have not discussed the profitability of the game with regards to effective rake or the possibility of bots or “super-software” that might exploit such a profitable game.
I think though, that with all of these things together, we do in fact have enough parameters to derive and solve an equilibrium solution, which could be not only exciting for all of the players of today and the future, but could also be used to put pressure on the current status quo standards of the game.
Lastly and most interestingly there seems to be a middle ground adjustment the centralized site models and current status quo sites could take that might extend their own sustainability and profitability, but one wonders if they will stumble upon this adjustment or whether they would care if presented it. Seems quite obvious now though, the centralized model (especially with “servers”) has a limited time, probably less than a year if they continually refuse to adopt ideal payment processing systems for the players benefit.
As Gzesh points out not being able to secure the game in this regard (ie ddsos attacks) might not be directly related to the security of the players roll’s but knowing that with a superior payment processing option available, that allows player’s zero threat to security in regards to their rolls (and at zero cost), but it certainly cannot be said by any individual knowledgeable on such security systems, that lack of proper security in one area does not cast doubt on all others in which that company is contracted to secure.
This is all exactly the point isn’t it? The games are dry (especially relatively). Skill level/knowledge of the game has been growing over time and so has effective skill (ie less recs vs pros). And so the field has been more and more breakeven over time, why hasn’t rake dropped in relation (whereas in some cases it has increased)? All this while sites continue to make changes that clearly have an adverse effect on effective rake (from the players perspective of course). Mason and Sklansky admit an environment where sites have been gaining a larger and larger % of the pie. As pointed out in this thread there is a status quo/monopolistic environment held up by government regulations.
Poker is a game (and games in general) where we attempt to maximally exploit for our maximal gain. There can be no changes such as different structures, different rules, hud banning, complex rake/rakeback schemes etc., that will bring life and profitability back into the game-the field will just adjust. We sound silly fighting over the problems and solutions, mass tabling for example is a phenomenon largely coming from an over raked game. Mass tabling didn’t cause the over raking (as a % nor effective), nor will regulating it fix anything.
An over raked environment attracts mediocre minds and ideas, a profitable environment will do the opposite. All of these peoples ideas about miracle tweaks and new games and different religious beliefs on what will fix things (such as tweeting politicians) is simply from “bad players” with bad strategies that are playing the game of politics and economics with the belief that they can effect the deck with their desires and emotions.
The monies sites rake as profit must come down, there is no other way to breathe life into the game. It doesn’t matter how coveted these people giving lectures and seminars are.
On Gzesh’s point they are obviously correct, poker variants ARE poker PROVIDED that there is skilled monies to win (and a reasonable amount). But if one game is not so profitable then one must wonder why the status quo site does not rake profitable games at the same effective rake as the not profitable ones (ie target profits by raising rake %)? So what seems most likely is none of these games are very profitable. There has been obvious intelligent points made about letting the markets decide the structures, games, stakes etc., and this is OBVIOUSLY the most favorable implementation. Of course while creating profits and life for the game and the players within, short sited monopolies cannot see how this benefits them, nor are they “politically structured” to make such a change.
I find it not so fair that we are stuck with leaders that have such obvious old school beliefs, and I find it equally as silly that Gzesh seems to be the leading thinker on the game here. Nonetheless this is all why we propose a sliding rake % as a function of effective rake. This fixes the incentive for all parties to favor a profitable and sustainable environment for the pro, which will keep the whole game in such a healthy state perpetually.
edit: also there is certainly great irony isn’t there in arguing for not taking recs money to quickly but adding variants like spin n go’s, especially on the premise they will attract money to the game, knowing that players are leaving for the more “casino” style. Is it coincidence this is a favorable change in regards to effective rake, but only for *’s?