As evidenced by recent forum discussion, the topic of third-party software in online poker is a highly complex and contentious issue. As new software is developed, we must keep our rules enforcement up to date and also consider when rules need to be changed.~http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/28/internet-poker/3rd-party-software-pokerstars-proposed-rule-changes-1538981/
Poker players need a profitable game in order to secure the integrity of it. Having a profitable game to a certain extent and beyond, arises the inevitability that “malicious players” will use bots for maximum profits. These bots will be maximally scaled for maximum profits for the malicious player/party that sets up the bots.
This is not unlike today’s massive stables run by large staking entities. A new game like “spin n go” arises and stakers/coaches seek to exploit the profits and change to the maximum degree. Just like large staking groups, bots will inevitably bring the profitability of the game down to a certain level. Any solution to the technical flaws or economic systems of the game should take both these phenomenon into account.
Profitability IS Security
There are a few major complaints that have been growing in the consciousness of the collective players over time. Software advantages are often discussed by players as something that gives certain players an unfair edge over others. This is much like another issue that is becoming more and more a reality-bots. These two issues are also very inter-related with the possibilities of collusion amongst players or bots. However these issues should not be the TRUE concern in the eyes of the individual or the collective player. Truly the only issue that matters here is the profitability. If a certain game is profitable for the individual, and especially more profitable than today’s current equivalent, then why should this player care if there is any human players at all?!
Private Games are the Future of Poker
In the diagram of decentralized serverless poker, there is a distinction made between private games and public games. Private games simply require an invite of some sort and public games are more of the wild west with randomized seating. Randomized seating solves the problem of collusion PROVIDED one party doesn’t hold a major economic majority of the entire field. Although unlikely such a situation could be solved further, much like bitcoin’s 51% attack, by decentralizing the major bot/staking pools that might arise. There is a basic formula here, an equation to see and to balance, in how profitable a game might be, in relation to n pools of bots/staking groups.
Bots (and Players) as Nodes
The basic change from the present model to a conceived future model is that players are to act as nodes to hold up the integrity of the network rather than the traditional centralized server model nearly all sites use today. Players essentially are then able to set up and cryptographically deal/verify their own games rather than using the more expensive traditional model of “contracting” third party trust for such verification. The new model elects random jury’s from the entire pool to verify different aspects of the entire system. PROVIDED, the majority of the jury pool isn’t owned by a single entity, such a method can be theoretically secure.
Once again this highlights the need for a decentralized field as describe previously.
The Future Model of Sites
Provided this P2P layer exists much of the existing overhead disappears from site models. There is still much need for attracting types of player pools. There may still be a need for other types of security solutions, however, these solutions can now be more tailored, less costly, and have the advantage of a more rapid evolution since the entry to implementation will be so much lower.
Incentivizing Bots and Malicious Entities to Cooperate
Now we have an economy in which there can be brought about an equilibrium that might prove favorable for the future of poker. Since bots can be used as verification nodes that hold up the integrity of the games (ie cryptographic dealing), it makes economic sense to use them for these purposes rather than expensive third party solutions. On the other hand such nodes will not cooperate or participate without the proper compensation. Truly it matters not (in this context) these bots/node earn this compensation through actual gameplay, rakeback, direct payments, or shares/crypto-coin etc. This suggests there IS a great equilibrium to be found. The bots require a certain profit to verify the private game pool, and such a profit can be realized through a system equivalent to today’s rake/rakeback systems.
The Importance of Effective Rake as a Metric and Free Market Competition
“The nonpolitical industrial consumption price index Nash described in his 2002 paper is represented by the bitcoin network’s intelligent design towards regulating mining consumption power and readjusting the difficulty and block rewards accordingly.~https://diginomics.com/library/the-bitcoin-revolution/”
The concept of Effective Rake plays an important but hidden role here (much like the hidden role of an industrial composition index plays in regards to bitcoin’s mining process as highlighted here). Because bots can certainly act as nodes, and will also necessarily be the most profitable players in the public games AND if much of the “kick back” from private games could be paid back through a type of rakeback program, there is now levated the possibility of an effective rake standard for the public games. This entire system assumes (and indeed theoretically provides!) a certain context of free market competition where the verification nodes/bots “out-bid” each other to offer the most cost efficient solution (this suggests a lower consumer price because of such competition between node pools).
What is important to note is the effective rake becomes defined as the market equilibrium and thus is a product of competing forces rather than an actual metric to be “predicated” and then achieved through “policy”.
Isn’t Ideal Poker “Rake-Less”?
Truly the future of poker is to involve a great change in perception and also the intelligence and direction in which the entire collective of the poker community might function. This “function”, is and will be seen as, truly a product of the nature of rake. When rake is allowed to be high, we will see a very perturbed society, that is not very interested in the inner workings (and macro) of the economics of the game. As rake asymptotically slides towards zero, we will expect to see a greater and greater change in this context. As life gets breathed into the game, so too will it attract the intelligent and creative minds that gave it its first successive generations of booms. The system described here, is both the catalyst and ultimately a symptom of the beginning of the realization and implementation of such a change.
Ideal Poker IS rakeless from the players perspective. Ideal-ness one can note, is also conceptual and theoretical. What we propose is to begin to define such an ideal and (only then can we) begin to move in that direction.