P2P Poker Proposal Outline

An implementable P2P internet poker protocol, with the ability to transfer value depending on game flow results, would allow poker to be played over the internet without the need for a trusted third party.

Current state of poker

Today over 70% of the ipoker industry is controlled by one entity Amaya gaming.

http://www.amaya.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Q2-2015-Conference-Call-Webcast-Presentation_20150813_for-Website1.pdf

Mental Poker

A relevant history of mental poker including its historically limitations and proposed solutions: https://thewealthofchips.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/4022/

Why bitcoin/blockchain is necessary

Since a poker hand can be thought of as a complex transaction based on some per-determined but unknown, or determined, or probabilistic event, it is observable that poker also suffers from the same double spend problem that S. Nakamtoto solved.

Lightning Channels and Duplex Channels

LC’s provide a sufficeiently rapid feasible method of ensuring payments are being made without the ability to reneg. LC’s support full dropout tolerance and malicious actors because of the credible threat of posting reneged transactions to the block chain. The solution is off-chain, but relies on the block-chain for its effectiveness.

Solving Reneging

How to Use Bitcoin to Play Decentralized Poker http://people.csail.mit.edu/ranjit/papers/poker.pdf

This paper proposes a protocol solution whereby any player that refuses to participate for selfish gain forfeits a substantial fee to each player that is playing honestly. This removes any possible economic incentive for such dishonest action.

Collusion, Bots, Hud’s, and Other Possible Types of Cheating

2 types of collusion: Sybil and Player collusion.

The proposal and protocol is secure against the traditional concept of a Sybil attack.

There is still the difficulty, from the players perspective, in understanding how a P2P environment can police collusion, bots, hud’s, and other types of cheating. A secure implementable P2P mental poker protocol provides the necessary infrastructure and tools for many competing poker site to arise and to solve these problems. Rake can be paid to these sites to provide any, all, or none of the historical solutions that the centralized server model generally included.

Conclusion

Solving collusion by removing the barrier to entry to provide a poker site, thereby creating a competitive market. We do this by the introduction of a protocol that removes the need for a trusted third party that handles security of chips, dealing, gameflow, and cashout/deposits. The implementation of the protocol is secure from Sybil attacks, trustworthy, effectively instant, and exponentially cheaper allowing sites to offer a rake policy and service of competitive quality because of a drastically reduced overhead.

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