Notes on Methodological Rake Standards and Policies

RE: long term profitability and sustainability our viewpoint is methodological. Ultimately optimal rake policy can’t be conceived. It must be discovered by the markets (players/customers!).
Sites have inherited the “Triffin Dilemma” via their Keynesian nature of central issuance & eff. rake targeting: “…the conflict of economic interests that arises between short-term domestic and long-term international objectives…”
In short, rake policies should be set so the players/customers vote with raked monies for the optimal long term sustainable environment.
A theoretical algorithm is then levated, through extension (I. Money) and extrapolation (History of Poker).

It seems to me we are in a strange environment. For quite some time and especially since black friday, players have been somewhat trapped in accepting the major poker site options offered to them. Recently many complaints about different security and profitability problems have left many players at least wishing they had reasonable alternatives for their monies. Some people hope some bitcoin sites might arise offer this, and although there hasn’t arisen such a major competitor, we must think the rising competition has SOME effect on the future policies of the existing dinosaurs.

More and more, and especially as the average field tends towards GTO pokerz (we are getting better as a whole right?) it seems that players, as customers, will learn to demand for a more profitable game (or at least one that does not have declining profits over time). And so it seems to me that sites are in a pickle. None wants to be the one to lower rake, yet each is running out of its benefit of status quo rake policies (player base is declining).

Is it clear to us all that once rake starts to decline, players will begin to collectively demand (as customers spending their money) more of it?

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