I think if its possible we might have something to take from Ideal Poker as an extension of Ideal Money and in regard to the implementation of mental poker it might be found in regard to the conjecture that trustworthy third parties are sufficiently secure.
To be quick to the point, many people (especially when discussing the concept of p2p poker) seem to often miss that Satoshi did NOT implement or create in any fashion banks when he released bitcoin through the bitcoin.pdf in 2009.
Satoshi did not propose the solution to our banking system, especially at that time, when he introduced the scheme and security for the production and distribution for 21 million divisible coin assets.
I am wondering if this might be a significant point in regards to the implementation of mental poker. We are seemingly still trying to solve the re-neg problem which is also really the problem of implementing the already solved protocol in the real world situation that is 1) over the internet and 2) using bitcoin or crypto currency.
The problem has to do with needing to punish the re-neger (only!) and to punish them with the exact economic dis-incentive that is required for an equilibrium that is favourable for practical game play.
My proposal or thought here is that, given some crude form or algorithm for addressing this problem,that might be 1) too unfair to the re-neger 2) still unfair to the other players or 3) perhaps only provable as a conjecture, it might be possible and practical to leave the remaining unsolved aspects of the problem of implementation to a 3rd party.
This might seem alarming at first but the author feels they might be able to render such a 3rd party to be only and always trustworthy to a sufficient degree of trustworthiness.