The Bargaining Problem Assumes Ideal Money

(super undeveloped thoughts, no idea if this is nonsensical or terrible)

“… if we allow mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one Nash equilibrium.”

The number of players in this world might be said to be finite at any given moment. Yet in another way the amount of players and the players in this game could be seen as effectively infinite over the history evolution and future of mankind (or life, or the universe).

It seems that the addition of mixed strategies allows us to solve all games. Providing the possibility for a more specific solution.

Nash showed in the bargaining problem that money allows us to optimize trade.

Money in this sense allows for the granular solutions which are comparable to mixed strategies, as if one could somehow divide the goods if needed but without destroying their value (perhaps goods are comparable to pure strategies).

I should think that it might be shown that money in “any given moment” is ideal, and renders the situation comparable to the bargaining problem.

Then there is the suggestion that in extending the metaphor of a simple game to a higher level economic system there is the possibility of different qualities of money to study.

In regards to iterations it might be that iterations like frames from a film, might involve ideal money, but somehow begin to highlight a scenario with a fluctuating currency.

Then there might be some uncertainty involved in the value of the currency or some notable degradation of the value “in the moment” of a frame.

This could be represented in the bargaining problem in various ways related to some of the points above.

 

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