Generalizing the Bargaining Problem

I think that the bargaining problem as proposed/solved by John Nash can actually be seen as having used the assumption of ideal money (stable in relation to purchasing power!). It is like a cross section of a higher level game or problem that might involve money of differing quality over time (and/or of uncertain quality from the views of the players).

I’m guessing we might not have studied or generalized this problem like this since it would seem to formally highlight the dis-favorable characteristics of Keynesian economics (as defined in “Ideal Money”).

I suspect also this wasn’t out of Nash’s intuitive reach at the time he proposed the solution to the bargaining problem.

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